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 1 
EVERYBODY NEEDS TO KNOW? 
 
This reader came away from Sosa’s Judgment and Agency with the poignant 
impression of an otherwise sophisticated and compelling view encumbered by an 
implausible central element. The sophisticated and compelling view is Sosa’s ‘virtue 
reliabilism’. The implausible element is the appeal to the notion of an ‘intention to affirm 
aptly’. These comments explore the possibility of an unencumbered virtue reliabilism in 
which the role Sosa assigns to such intentions is played by something else instead. 
The discussion has four parts. §1 sketches just enough of the Judgment and 
Agency system to bring out the role intentions to affirm aptly play within it. §2 introduces 
the notion of what I shall call a ‘need’ – a mental state which is like an intention in that it 
moves us to action, but unlike an intention, is not a propositional attitude. §3 explores the 
possibility of a form of virtue reliabilism in which appeal to such a need – the need to 
attain knowledge – replaces Sosa’s appeal to intentions to affirm aptly. §4 raises some 
questions that might be explored in comparing Sosa’s framework (intention-based virtue 
reliabilism) and the need-based alternative proposed in §3. 
 
1 Intention-based virtue reliabilism 
 
 This section sketches Sosa’s virtue reliabilism. It is not possible in so constricted 
a space to explain the view in its full sophistication. So I shall say just enough to isolate 
the element upon which I wish to focus: the appeal to intentions to affirm aptly.  
 Here is what I take to be Sosa’s central suggestion. Forming a belief or making a 
judgment is a performance aimed at an outcome. And an account of the normative status 
of this kind of performance should proceed along the lines we use in assessing normative 
status for performances-aimed-at-outcomes in general. In general, when assessing 
whether such a performance has gone well, we ask the following three questions: 
 
1 What was the outcome at which the performance aimed? 
2 Was this outcome attained? 
3 Was it attained through the exercise of the subject’s competence in executing such 
performances (in a way that manifests1 this competence), rather than coming about as a 
matter of luck?  
 
If the answers to 2 and 3 are ‘yes’, the performance reaches the gold standard as far as 
positive normative status for performances is concerned: it is a performance whose aim is 
achieved through the exercise of the subject’s competence. Propositional knowledge is 
what we get when a performance of belief formation reaches this gold standard. Belief 
formation is a performance that aims at truth. A belief counts as knowledge iff it is true, 
                                                   
1 The notion of ‘manifestation’, carefully explained in Ch2, is a primitive in the framework. The suggestion 
is that a performance manifests a competence iff it is causally derived from the competence in a way that 
involves no deviant causal chains, where the right hand side of this biconditional is not to be regarded as 
explanatorily prior to the left: causal derivation of performance from competence without a deviant causal 
chain is just what there is in cases of manifestation. 
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and the subject’s arriving at a true belief in the instance in question is a result generated 
in an appropriate way by the subject’s exercise of belief-forming competence.2  
 When combined with a suitably generous account of what it is to form and hold a 
belief, this proposal generates a quite catholic account of what can count as propositional 
knowledge. Suppose that there is belief wherever there is ‘aiming’ at truth, and there is 
competence in belief formation wherever beliefs are formed by a means that is reliable at 
securing this aim. Then a subject can count as a believer just in virtue of having states 
formed by means that in some sense ‘aim’ at truth. So my dog has beliefs. And a state of 
a subject can count as a state of knowing in virtue of being an ‘aims at truth’ state; being 
true; and having its truth secured in an appropriate way by the reliable means of 
formation deployed in arriving at it. So my dog knows things.  
If we just stopped there, the normative status of those among my beliefs which 
count as knowledge would come out as no different from that of various states of my dog. 
This would be at least a disconcerting result. But Sosa does not just stop there. He 
distinguishes, within the over-arching framework, two kinds of positive normative status 
for performances: 
 
Animal aptness – a performance is ‘animally apt’ iff it is aimed at bringing about some 
end state that can be specified without mention of how it is to be brought about, and this 
aim is attained through the exercise of the subject’s competence in executing such 
performances. 
 
Full/reflective aptness – a performance is ‘fully apt’ iff it is aimed at bringing about some 
end-state as an appropriately generated result of the exercise of the subject’s competence 
in executing such performances, and the end-state is in fact brought about in this way. 
 
For the epistemological case, the suggestion is now that human knowledge – the 
traditional subject matter of epistemology – is fully apt belief. The mental states of ours 
that count as ‘knowledge’ in this sense are ‘judgments’. They are beliefs formed with the 
aim of being true in virtue of being formed by an exercise of true-belief-forming 
competence which do in fact have their truth secured in this way.3 
 So far we have said nothing about intentions. Intentions enter the framework with 
Sosa’s specification of the aims of performances which are sophisticated enough to be up 
for evaluation as fully apt or not. Sosa is explicit about the fact that the aims 
characteristic of performances that have (in the best case) only animal aptness need not 
be encoded in intentions.4 But where a performance is fully apt, he suggests that it has an 
aim which is encoded in an intention.5  
 These elements combine to give the following account of judgment and of our 
(human) knowledge: 
 
                                                   
2 For summaries incorporating all or some of these elements see 1, 19, 65-77 
3 For the distinction between ‘full’ and ‘animal’ aptness see 67-73. For the distinction applied to belief-
formation as a performance, see 74-77.  
4 See especially 67-69.  
5 See for example 166.  
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1 A subject making a judgment intends to form a true belief as a result of the exercise of 
true-belief-forming competence.  
2 The resulting belief counts as knowledge iff (i) it is true, and (ii) the subject’s formation 
of a true belief in this instance is appropriately secured by (manifests) the exercise of the 
competence mentioned in 1.  
 
 The next three sections explore the possibility of a view which goes along with 
much of Sosa’s discussion, including the claim that human knowledge is fully apt 
judgment, but disembarks at the claim that the aim of judgment is encoded in an 
intention.  
 
2 The ‘conceptual’/ ‘non-conceptual’ distinction for the case of motivational states 
 
 This section develops the distinction between two kinds of motivational state: 
intentions, and what I shall call ‘needs’. 
 Let us start by thinking not about motivational states, but about representational 
ones. I shall suppose – following Peacocke6 – that a mental state is ‘representational’ iff it 
has correctness conditions. And I shall adopt Peacocke’s account of the distinction 
between conceptual and non-conceptual representational states: a representational state is 
‘conceptual’ iff being in it involves grasp of its correctness conditions, and ‘non-
conceptual’ otherwise. So a mental state is a non-conceptual representational state iff it 
has correctness conditions, but a subject can be in it without having the capacity to grasp 
them. Many people have argued that beliefs are conceptual representational states and 
perceptual experiences non-conceptual ones: you cannot believe that the defenestration of 
the lords regent precipitated the Thirty Years’ War unless you grasp the concepts 
defenestration, lord regent, precipitate, and Thirty Years’ War, but a subject could have a 
perceptual experience that represents a blue cube without grasping the concepts blue and 
cubical.  
 There is obviously room for argument and discussion about the details of this 
basic framework for the case of representational states. However, let me just ignore the 
details, and move to the suggestion I want to make: the basic ‘conceptual’/ ‘non-
conceptual’ distinction transfers quite readily to the case of motivational states. To see 
how, note first that, just as a representational state has correctness conditions, a 
motivational state has what I shall call ‘fulfilment’ conditions – conditions which must be 
met if the state is to be fulfilled. For example, if I intend to A, I am in a motivational state 
whose fulfilment requires my A-ing (or my A-ing in a way appropriately guided by my 
intention). But having recognised that motivational states have fulfilment conditions, it is 
a short step to a conceptual/non-conceptual distinction that parallels the distinction we 
drew in the representational case: 
 
A motivational state is ‘conceptual’ iff being in it requires grasp of the concepts that 
would be involved in specifying its fulfilment conditions 
 
A motivational state is ‘non-conceptual’ iff being in it does not require grasp of the 
concepts that would be involved in specifying its fulfilment conditions.  
                                                   
6 ‘A Study of Concepts’ Ch3. 
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 With the distinction in place I do not think it is an unwarranted step to the claim 
that it applies to the motivational states that guide our own actions. An intention is a 
conceptual motivational state: to have an intention, you have to grasp what it is an 
intention to do. (If I am to intend to defenestrate the lords regent, I must grasp the 
concepts defenestration and lord regent). But we are also moved to action by non-
conceptual motivational states – what I shall call ‘needs’. The most familiar needs are 
animal or emotional. They are needs many of which we share with other higher animals, 
and which are characteristic of our emotional lives: the need to avoid hunger; the need to 
avoid loneliness; the need to feel secure. Dogs, small children, and other beings who lack 
the conceptual sophistication required to grasp the fulfilment conditions of these needs 
routinely act in ways motivated by them: these are non-conceptual motivational states. 
 And having recognised animal and emotional needs, there is no apparent barrier 
to recognition of what I shall call ‘rational’ needs – needs the having of which is 
characteristic of our rational lives. For example, I think it is plausible that we need (when 
we are awake) to be sustaining a comfortable level of cognitive activity, and need to have 
a comfortable level of coherence in our cognitive lives.  
 So here is a suggestion. One of our rational needs is the need to know. This is a 
non-conceptual motivational state – a state which guides much of our belief-forming 
activity, but the having of which does not require the cognitive sophistication involved in 
specifying what it is a need for.   
 
 
3 Need-based virtue reliabilism 
 
 Now let us consider how the possibility of motivation by a rational need might be 
grafted into Sosa’s virtue reliabilist framework. The basic suggestion would be to replace 
Sosa’s appeal to an intention to form true beliefs by means that manifest true-belief-
forming competence with an appeal to a need to do the same thing. So instead of Sosa’s 1 
and 2 from the end of §1, we would have the following: 
 
1 A subject making a judgment is moving to a belief under the guidance of the need to 
form true beliefs whose formation manifests true-belief-forming competence.  
2 The resulting belief counts as knowledge iff (i) it is true, and (ii) the subject’s formation 
of a true belief in this instance in fact does manifest this competence.  
 
Now, this proposal will get off the ground only if we can make sense of the notion 
of ‘guidance by a need’. And in fact, it is in explaining how the motivational state 
characteristic of judgment plays its guiding role that it seems to me that Sosa’s claim that 
this motivational state is an intention does most work.7 So one possible point of 
resistance to need-based virtue reliabilism is right here, at the notion of guidance by a 
need – an objector might say that a non-propositional motivational state cannot play the 
kind of ‘guiding’ role that fully apt judgment (knowledge full well) requires. 
                                                   
7 The suggestion is that the sophistication of the intention brings with it an extra layer of non-luckiness in 
the success of the guided performance. See the discussion of pp84-88. 
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 But I think it would be premature to give up on need-based virtue reliabilism in 
the face of this objection..  
 One reason not to give up is that if we allow (as surely we should) that some of 
our agential behaviour is driven by non-conceptual motivational states, we shall require 
an account of guidance of behaviour by needs anyway, regardless of the role this kind of 
guidance might play in the kind of epistemological project I have sketched. 
 Another reason is that the rough outlines of an account of guidance by needs is 
actually ready to hand. The account I have in mind is built around the general notion of 
guidance by a goal-representing state: 
 
A ‘guidance’ system is characterised by 1-4:  
1 The system contains an internal representation of a goal. 
2 The system also contains a feedback mechanism which generates reports on current 
status. 
3 Moves made by the system are determined by the goal represented at (1) and the 
feedback about status at (2). 
4 If the system is functioning normally, then, over time, the function from (1) and (2) to 
output actions described at (3) tends towards reducing the difference between the goal 
state represented at (1) and the current state reported at (2).  
 
Given this very general characterization, there is a wide variety in ‘guidance’ systems. 
For example, a heating system controlled by a thermostat will count as a system of such a 
kind – in this case, the goal-representing state is the thermostat setting; if the system is 
functioning normally, the ‘output actions’ (furnace on, off, up, down) tend to reduce the 
gap between the temperature at which the thermostat is set and the ambient temperature 
that the feedback mechanism detects. (The 1-4 model draws on the ‘system-property’ 
view of goal directedness from the philosophy of biology.8 As far as I know, appeals to 
this kind of model of guidance were brought into the philosophy of action by Frankfurt.9) 
 Obviously we do not want to say that the thermostat setting is a ‘motivational 
state’ of the heating system. So we need to distinguish guidance in general from guidance 
by motivational states of the subject: 
 
Guidance by a motivational state is the special case of 1-4 where the goal-representing 
state is a personal level state of a subject. 
 
Given this account of guidance by a motivational state, guidance by intention comes out 
as one case of the general phenomenon (the case where the goal-representing state is a 
conceptual state of the subject), and guidance by a need comes out as another (the case 
where the goal-representing state is non-conceptual). 
  Of course, even given this general account of guidance by needs, it will remain to 
show how any particular need does its behaviour-guiding work. For the case of the need 
to know, the idea will be that the goal and the feedback mechanism steer us towards 
belief-forming activities which will result in true beliefs that manifest out belief-forming 
                                                   
8 See Nagel ‘Goal-directed Processes in Biology’§4; Adams ‘The Goal-State Theory of Function 
Attribution’ 506-7. 
9 In ‘The Problem of Action’. 
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competence unless the situation is in some way unusual or devious. (If the situation is 
devious or unusual, the subject will end up with a case of competent but failed (because 
unlucky) performance). For example, for the most central cases of ‘knowing full well’ on 
the basis of perception, a full version of the kind of view I am sketching would explain 
how the goal represented – formation of true beliefs which manifest true-belief-forming 
competence –  and the relevant mechanisms for detection of current status – perception; 
the mechanisms that generate the kind of sensitivity to defeaters characteristic of our 
perception-based belief-forming –  combine to generate the familiar ‘default acceptance 
with sensitivity to defeaters’ pattern. And the full version would tell a parallel story about 
‘knowing full well’ on the basis of testimony.  
I take it that there would be substantial structural overlap between these stories as 
occurring in a full version of need-based virtue reliabilism and the stories about 
knowledge from perception and testimony10 already there in Sosa’s’s intention-based 
view. The main difference would be that the need-based stories would treat the most 
central cases of sensitivity to defeaters as achievements more primitive than, and not 
calling upon, the kind of second-order conceptual representation of beliefs, the means to 
their formation, what it is for a belief to be true, and what it is for a true belief to manifest 
true-belief-forming competence which, in Sosa’s framework, is always at work when 
knowledge full well is attained. 
 The reader may have noticed the insertion of a hedge in the previous paragraph. I 
began this section talking about need-based virtue reliabilism as a view of knowledge full 
well in general. But the claim in the previous paragraph was only that this model should 
be applied to the most ‘central cases’ of beliefs formed on the basis of testimony or 
perception. And in fact I do think it is plausible that there is a kind of very reflective 
knowledge where something like Sosa’s intention-based story applies. Perhaps scientific 
investigation works like this – the scientist proceeds under the guidance of an intention to 
form true beliefs that manifest true-belief-forming competence. So the suggestion is in 
fact that there are three cases where Sosa is distinguishing only two: 
 
Sosa’s view 
 
 
 
                                                   
10 For the view of knowledge from testimony see for example 116-17. For the view of knowledge from 
perception see for example 150-153. 
Propositional	  knowledge
Animal	  knowledge	  -­‐‑ true	  belief	  formed	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  forming	  a	  true	  belief,	  	  and	  manifesting	  competence	  in	  fulfilment	  of	  this	  aim
Knowledge	  full	  well	  -­‐‑ true	  belief	  formed	  with	  the	  intention	  of	  forming	  a	  belief	  that	  is	  both	  true	  and	  a	  manifestation	  of	  true-­‐‑belief-­‐‑forming	  competence,	  and	  manifesting	  competence	  in	  fulfilment	  of	  	  this	  intention
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The view sketched in these comments 
 
 
4 Comparison 
 
 This final section makes three points of comparison between Sosa’s intention-
based virtue reliabilism and the need-based alternative that I have sketched. §4.a 
considers one central illustration of the puzzle-solving power of Sosa’s framework, and 
argues that the central features of this part of his discussion are straightforwardly 
transferable to the need-based framework. §4.b considers a kind of puzzle case for which 
I suggest that the need-based framework might come out ahead of the intention-based 
one. §4.c steps back to ask which framework looks more attractive considered aside from 
issues of puzzle-solving power.  
  
4.a Gettier cases and reliable clairvoyance 
 
 Sosa spends a substantial portion of Judgment and Agency showing how his view 
generates solutions to traditional puzzles in epistemology. This subsection summarises 
one strand of such puzzle-solving – the discussion of why our intuitions fall out the way 
they do with respect to Gettier cases and cases of reliable clairvoyance – and argues that 
Sosa’s proposal, developed in his intention-based framework, is, in all important respects, 
available in the need-based framework too. 
 Consider a ‘fake barns’ Gettier case and a case of reliable clairvoyance:  
 
FAKE BARNS   X is in a circumstance whose ordinariness she has no reason to doubt, and is looking at 
something which both looks like a barn and in fact is a barn. X forms, on the basis of her perceptual 
experience, the belief she would express by saying ‘That is a barn’. However, though the barn-like thing 
she is looking at as she forms her belief is a barn, most of the barn-like things visible from the road along 
Propositional	  
knowledge
Animal	  knowledge	  -­‐‑ true	  belief	  formed	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  forming	  a	  true	  belief,	  	  and	  manifesting	  competence	  in	  fulfilment	  of	  this	  aim
Knowledge	  full	  well -­‐‑ true	  belief	  formed	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  forming	  a	  belief	  that	  is	  both	  true	  and	  a	  manifestation	  of	  true-­‐‑belief-­‐‑forming	  competence,	  and	  manifestimg	  competence	  in	  fulfilment	  of	  	  this	  aim
Reflective	  case -­‐‑ the	  goal-­‐‑representing	  state	  is	  an	  intention
Basic	  case	  -­‐‑ the	  goal-­‐‑representing	  state	  is	  a	  need
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which X is driving are not barns but barn-facades, erected to encourage the impression that the factory-
farmed countryside X is traversing is still cultivated by rustic barn-involving means.11  
 
RELIABLE CLAIRVOYANCE   Though Y does not realise it, he is a reliable clairvoyant. Y does not often arrive 
at beliefs by the exercise of his faculty of clairvoyance. And when he does arrive at beliefs in this way, he  
is not aware that this is how they have been reached. But, nevertheless, Y does sometimes arrive at beliefs 
by clairvoyance, and when he does so these beliefs are reliably true.12  
 
Starting with these cases, Sosa argues as follows:13 
 
i) It is a widely acknowledged intuition that in the fake barn case X’s true belief does not 
count as knowledge. And it is widely held that the reason the belief does not count as 
knowledge is that it is somehow ‘unsafe’ – there is some respect in which the condition 
that X could not easily have been wrong in a similar case fails. 
 
ii) It is also a widely acknowledged intuition that the beliefs Y forms by reliable 
clairvoyance do not count as knowledge because there is something wrong with the route 
to their formation, even though this route is, for Y, a safe generator of true beliefs. 
 
But 
 
iii) Though (i) and (ii) capture one line of intuitive response to the respective cases, there 
is also an intuitive pull in each case towards the claim that the relevant beliefs do count as 
knowledge.  
 
iv) Virtue reliabilism generates an explanatory clean sweep of the (i)-(iii) data. 
 
So 
 
v) We have an argument from explanatory power for the virtue reliabilist framework. 
 
 The case for (iv) hinges on a distinction that the virtue reliabilist framework 
generates between two notions of ‘safety’: 
 
Safety with respect to animal aptness (‘safety of affirmation’): a belief is ‘safe with 
respect to animal aptness’ iff formed by a means which could not easily have generated a 
false belief.  
 
Safety with respect to full aptness (‘safety of judgment’): a belief is ‘safe with respect to 
full aptness’ iff formed by a means which is (a) guided by the subject’s intention to form 
a true belief whose formation manifests the relevant true-belief-forming competence, and 
(b) could not easily have resulted in failure with respect to this intention.  
 
                                                   
11 Compare Goldman ‘Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge’ 
12 Compare Bonjour ‘Externalist Theories of Knowledge’ 
13 See 77-82 
 9 
The second of these safety conditions is much more demanding than the first. Safety with 
respect to animal aptness requires only that the belief be formed by a means that is 
reliable across a suitable range of similar circumstances. Safety with respect to full 
aptness requires that the performance of belief formation fulfil the intention to form a 
belief in a way that manifests true-belief-forming competence. If the first condition is met 
but the second is not – if the belief is safe with respect to animal aptness but not full 
aptness – there is a sense in which it is a mere matter of luck that the route to belief-
formation that the subject deploys is a reliable one. 
 With the distinction between kinds of safety in place, it is a short step to Sosa’s 
account of the (i)-(iii) combination. Sosa argues that both fake barn Gettier cases and 
reliable clairvoyance involve safety with respect to animal aptness but not full aptness. 
For the clairvoyant, the second-order intention characteristic of full aptness is missing: Y 
is not even aware that he has the faculty by which his belief is formed, so can have no 
intention to form a belief by its means. In the ‘fake barns’ case the second order intention 
is present but not fulfilled: X intends to form a true belief in a way that manifests true-
belief-forming competence; since the belief is true as a mere matter of luck, this intention 
is not fulfilled. But in the virtue reliabilist framework a true belief counts as human 
knowledge/knowledge full well iff it is safe with respect to full aptness. So neither X’s 
belief in the fake barns case nor Y’s beliefs formed by reliable clairvoyance count as 
knowledge full well. However, in each case the beliefs do count as animal knowledge: 
they are true beliefs that are safe with respect to animal aptness. So Sosa can explain both 
the ‘There is not knowledge here’ intuitions at (i) and (ii) and the ‘There is knowledge 
here’ intuitions at (iii). The ‘There is not knowledge here’ intuitions are explained by the 
absence of knowledge full well. The ‘There is knowledge here’ intuitions are explained 
by the presence of animal knowledge. 
 This strikes me as an elegant account of the target intuitions. But as far as I can 
see a structural parallel is available in the need-based framework too. The need-based 
framework can just co-opt Sosa’s notion of safety with respect to full aptness, adjusting 
as required: 
 
Safety with respect to full aptness (alternative version) A belief is ‘safe with respect to 
full aptness’ iff formed by a means which is (a) guided by a motivational state (either an 
intention or a need) whose goal is the formation of true beliefs by means that manifest 
true-belief-forming competence, and (b) could not easily have failed to fulfill this goal.  
 
We have seen that Sosa’s account of the (i)-(iii) combination turns on the claim that the 
relevant beliefs are safe with respect to animal aptness but not full aptness. But the need-
based virtue reliabilist framework generates this same result. The clairvoyant’s beliefs are 
unsafe with respect to full aptness because formed by a means which, though reliable, is 
not guided by am appropriate motivational state. For the subject in the ‘fake barns’ case, 
the mechanism of belief formation (uptake from perception) is guided by such a 
motivational state – the need to form beliefs by means that manifest true-belief-forming 
competence –  but the goal is not met so the need goes unfulfilled.  
 I conclude that Sosa’s virtue reliabilist account of the (i)-(iii) combination 
transfers quite readily to the need-based framework. The puzzle of how to account for the 
(i)-(iii) combination is just one of the many for which Sosa has virtue relliabilist 
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solutions. So it would obviously be a vault from here to the conclusion that the 
(considerable) puzzle-solving power of Sosa’s intention-based virtue reliabilism is shared 
by the need-based alternative. Therefore let me re-tool this potential conclusion – out of 
reach in the space available for present purposes – as a challenge: If puzzle-solving 
power is to provide grounds for preferring intention-based virtue reliabilism to the need-
based alternative, there must be puzzles that the intention-based view can solve and the 
need-based view cannot; the proponent of the intention-based view should tell us which 
these puzzles are. 
 
4.b Judgment in the face of second-order doubt 
 
 §4.a suggested that intention-based and need-based virtue reliabilisms might be 
on a par with respect to puzzle-solving power. This section raises a kind of case where 
the two views generate distinct diagnoses, and which might, therefore, provide the 
starting point for an argument for the conclusion that one of them has puzzle-solving 
power the other lacks.  
Consider the following scenario: 
 
You are having what seem to you to be ordinary perceptual experiences. But a source you take to be 
reliable has told you that you have been given an hallucinogen, and you have formed a belief to this effect. 
‘I really shouldn't believe my eyes’, you say to yourself. But the experiences that unfold in front of you are 
so mundane and realistic that you just can't help it. You believe that you are not in a position where beliefs 
formed by uptake from perception will manifest true-belief-forming competence. But you keep drifting into 
forming beliefs by this mechanism anyway. 
 
Now consider how Sosa’s intention-based virtue reliabilism will treat this kind of case. 
According to Sosa, judgment requires intending to form a true belief by a means that 
manifests true-belief-forming competence. But most philosophers who have worked on 
intention agree that intending to A requires believing that you will A, or is at least 
inconsistent with believing that you will not or cannot A14. Given these claims,  
the belief-formings in cases like the one described cannot be judgments: there can be no 
cases of judgment in the presence of second-order doubt about whether you are in a 
situation where judgment is appropriate.  
 In the need-based framework, this result falls away. Acting under the guidance of 
a need does not entail believing that you are on the way to fulfilling the need. So the 
subject in the case described can count as acting under the same motivation as drives 
ordinary cases of belief formation: as judging in the face of a second order belief that s/he 
ought not to.  
 Is this an argument for the need-based model I have sketched? That depends on 
whether we should recognise the possibility of judgment in the face of second order 
doubts. This is a matter on which I am as yet undecided. I mention this kind of case as 
one clear instance where the difference between Sosa’s intention-based view and the 
need-based alternative comes to the fore. 
 
4.c A polemic against profoundly implicit propositional attitudes 
                                                   
14 See for example Anscombe Intention; Bratman Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reason 4, 15-18; Searle 
Intentionality 408-9; Velleman ‘How to Share an Intention’ 202-4. 
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  So far in this section I have taken some steps towards comparing the two virtue 
reliabilist views by their explanatory power. I shall close by saying something polemical 
in favour of the need-based view.  
It is commonplace to allow that only some of a subject’s beliefs at a time are 
‘occurrent’ (consciously endorsed by the subject at the time). Others are ‘dispositional’ 
(available for conscious endorsement, but not consciously endorsed). It is also 
commonplace to allow that only some of the things we count as believing are believed 
‘explicitly’ (represented by some specific state of the subject’s mind). Other things are 
believed ‘implicitly’ (they are not represented by states of the subject’s mind, but are 
swiftly and trivially derivable from things that are). And these distinctions – occurrent vs. 
dispositional; explicit vs. implicit – seem to apply to other propositional attitudes too. For 
example, my intention to get these comments in not too long after the deadline is 
occurrent as I write this sentence, because in writing the sentence I am also stating the 
intention. But it was merely dispositional a minute ago, and will be merely dispositional a 
minute hence. And my explicit intention to get the comments in not too long after the 
deadline entails many implicit intentions of form <I intend not to A tomorrow>, where A 
is some action whose incompatibility with getting the comments in is swiftly and trivially 
derivable by me from my explicit beliefs.  
In recognizing these distinctions, we allow that a subject considered at a time 
holds many propositional attitudes that she is not consciously endorsing at the time, and 
which are not, at the time, even in the stacks available for endorsement – they must first 
be derived by some swift and trivial step. But there is a tradition of recognising 
propositional attitudes even more distant from the conscious forefronts of our minds: 
attitudes we count as holding merely in virtue of the utility of supposing we do in 
enabling an hypothetical theorist to predict our behaviour or explain its rationality. I shall 
say that an explanation appeals to ‘profoundly implicit’ propositional attitudes iff it 
makes the kind of move I have just described – crediting a subject with propositional 
attitudes that are neither occurrent; available for occurrence; nor reachable from such 
attitudes by swift and trivial steps; and whose contents the subject may lack the 
conceptual resources to formulate. 
Though it would be at least difficult, and perhaps impossible to prove that appeals 
to profoundly implicit propositional attitudes are illegitimate, it is easier to show that 
anyone making such an appeal is keeping bad philosophical company. For the most 
thoroughgoing constructors of explanations appealing to profoundly implicit 
propositional attitudes were behaviourists, who denied that we have mental lives at all, 
and held that that a propositional attitude ascription is only ever a placeholder for an 
account of regularities between stimulus inputs and behavioural outputs. And the further 
we move from behaviourism, the less plausible such appeals seem. If you allow that there 
are facts of the matter about some of our mental states, why keep the pseudo-behaviourist 
claim that all there is to say about some others is what would enable a theorist knowing 
what the subject perceives and how she behaves to predict or explain her behaviour? In 
particular, if you abandon the behaviourist view of propositional attitudes which are 
occurrent, in the stacks, or trivially and immediately derivable by the subject, what non-
ad hoc grounds can you give for allowing some more subliminal range of propositional 
attitudes to which the abandoned behaviourist model still applies? 
 12 
Now, there are various points at which Sosa distances himself from the claim that 
the intention to affirm aptly must be either occurrent or explicit.15 But it seems to me that, 
given the sophistication of this intention, he needs to go further than this. The intention is 
the intention to form a true belief as a manifestation of true-belief-forming competence. 
Grasp of this intention’s propositional content requires grasp of the concepts of truth and 
belief; of true-belief-forming competence; and of manifestation (with its association with 
the notion of a deviant causal chain). Is it plausible to think that subjects who lack the 
conceptual sophistication to grasp these concepts or the proposition constructed from 
them cannot really make judgments on the basis of perception or testimony? I do not 
think this is plausible. I do not think Sosa thinks so either. But in that case the intentions 
at the heart of his virtue reliabilism are profoundly implicit – they are intentions allegedly 
held and acted upon by subjects who may lack the conceptual sophistication to grasp 
them. So I suggest that the appeal to intentions to affirm aptly brings Sosa into bad – bad 
because behaviourist – philosophical company. 
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